✅ e2e mock: add AppSec scenario + custom remediation header assertion

Address review feedback on the binary e2e suite: - mocklapi: add an AppSec WAF stand-in (--appsec-addr) that blocks any URI containing "rpc2" — the exact probe from examples/appsec-enabled — and allows the rest. Lets the suite exercise the plugin's AppSec wiring (header forwarding + allow/block enforcement) without the real CRS engine. - new scenarios/appsec: benign request passes, /foo/rpc2 is 403. - custom-ban-page: assert the banned response carries the custom remediation header (remediationHeadersCustomName), per review. - README: drop the "don't open issues / AppSec intentionally absent" framing; describe what the suite actually covers, including AppSec wiring. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-21 19:48:59 +02:00 · 2026-06-06 21:33:52 +02:00
parent 070a82992a
commit 8497f7de75
8 changed files with 98 additions and 19 deletions
@@ -10,20 +10,19 @@ suite** (real Traefik + Crowdsec, under `tests/e2e/scenarios`) is kept for
 high-fidelity debugging against a real Crowdsec but is not exercised in CI; it
 ships in its own PR (#333).

-## Scope — what this suite does and does NOT test
+## Scope — what this suite tests

 These tests validate the **plugin's own behaviour**: the request flow through
 the Traefik middleware, the live / none / stream modes, caching, trusted-IP
-bypass, and ban / captcha page rendering.
+bypass, ban / captcha page rendering, and the AppSec request path (header
+forwarding + enforcing the engine's allow/block verdict).

-They deliberately **do not** test that Crowdsec or its AppSec engine work
-correctly — that is validated and owned by the upstream maintainer
-([@maxlerebourg](https://github.com/maxlerebourg)), not by this plugin. The
-mock only emulates the slice of the LAPI HTTP contract the plugin consumes.
-
-So please **don't open issues here about Crowdsec/AppSec detection accuracy**
-based on this suite: the AppSec scenario is intentionally absent, and the mock
-returns whatever decisions the test tells it to.
+The mock stands in for Crowdsec, emulating the slice of the LAPI HTTP contract
+the plugin consumes — including a single, deterministic AppSec rule (block any
+URI containing `rpc2`, the probe from [`examples/appsec-enabled`](../../../examples/appsec-enabled)).
+It is not the real WAF engine, so this suite exercises the plugin's AppSec
+*wiring* rather than the detection accuracy of OWASP CRS / virtual patching —
+that lives upstream in Crowdsec.

 ## What runs

@@ -32,10 +31,11 @@ returns whatever decisions the test tells it to.
 | Traefik   | Binary `v3.7.1`, downloaded into `.cache/` (reused across local runs; re-downloaded on fresh CI runners) |
 | Plugin    | Loaded via `experimental.localPlugins` from the repo root (symlinked into `plugins-local/`) |
 | LAPI      | `mocklapi` — a stdlib-only Go command (its own nested module), compiled and cached under `.cache/`, driven through `/admin` endpoints instead of `cscli` |
+| AppSec    | WAF stand-in built into the mock — blocks URIs containing `rpc2`, allows the rest |
 | Backend   | A plain HTTP responder built into the mock |

 Fixed ports (override with env vars if needed): Traefik `8000`, LAPI `8090`,
-backend `8091`.
+backend `8091`, AppSec `8092`.

 ## Running locally

@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ mock/
    traefik.yml   # static Traefik config (shared by all scenarios)
  mocklapi/
    go.mod        # nested module — kept out of the plugin's build/lint/vendor
-    main.go       # mock LAPI + backend
+    main.go       # mock LAPI + AppSec stand-in + backend
  scenarios/
    <name>/
      dynamic.yml # Traefik dynamic config (router + bouncer middleware + backend)
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@
 # Unlike the Docker suite under tests/e2e/scenarios, this one runs Traefik as a
 # downloaded binary and replaces Crowdsec with a small HTTP mock (the mocklapi
 # Go command). It validates the plugin's own behaviour (modes, cache, trusted
-# IPs, ban / captcha rendering), NOT Crowdsec or AppSec correctness.
+# IPs, ban / captcha rendering, AppSec wiring) — not the accuracy of Crowdsec's
+# detection or its WAF engine, which the mock only stands in for.
 #
 # Dependencies: bash, curl, go, tar. The Traefik binary is downloaded and the
 # mock is compiled into .cache/ on first use. That cache persists across local
@@ -18,6 +19,7 @@ TRAEFIK_VERSION="${TRAEFIK_VERSION:-v3.7.1}"
 WEB_PORT="${WEB_PORT:-8000}"
 LAPI_PORT="${LAPI_PORT:-8090}"
 BACKEND_PORT="${BACKEND_PORT:-8091}"
+APPSEC_PORT="${APPSEC_PORT:-8092}"
 LAPI_KEY="${LAPI_KEY:-e2e-mock-key}"

 MOCK_LIB_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
@@ -183,19 +185,23 @@ start_stack() {
  sed \
    -e "s|@@APIKEY@@|${LAPI_KEY}|g" \
    -e "s|@@LAPI_HOST@@|127.0.0.1:${LAPI_PORT}|g" \
+    -e "s|@@APPSEC_HOST@@|127.0.0.1:${APPSEC_PORT}|g" \
    -e "s|@@BACKEND_URL@@|http://127.0.0.1:${BACKEND_PORT}|g" \
    -e "s|@@SCENARIO_DIR@@|${scenario_dir}|g" \
    "$scenario_dir/dynamic.yml" > "$WORKDIR/dynamic.yml"

  "$mock_bin" \
    --lapi-addr "127.0.0.1:${LAPI_PORT}" \
-    --backend-addr "127.0.0.1:${BACKEND_PORT}" >"$WORKDIR/mock.log" 2>&1 &
+    --backend-addr "127.0.0.1:${BACKEND_PORT}" \
+    --appsec-addr "127.0.0.1:${APPSEC_PORT}" >"$WORKDIR/mock.log" 2>&1 &
  MOCK_PID=$!

  ( cd "$WORKDIR" && exec "$traefik_bin" --configfile=traefik.yml ) >"$WORKDIR/traefik.log" 2>&1 &
  TRAEFIK_PID=$!

  wait_for_status "http://127.0.0.1:${LAPI_PORT}/health" 200 30
+  # AppSec stand-in: a bare GET carries no "rpc2" URI, so it answers 200 (allow).
+  wait_for_status "http://127.0.0.1:${APPSEC_PORT}/" 200 30
  # /ping is served by Traefik itself once it is up (plugin compilation included).
  wait_for_status "http://127.0.0.1:${WEB_PORT}/ping" 200 60
 }
@@ -4,9 +4,10 @@
 // test drive decisions through /admin instead of `cscli`. It also serves the
 // stub upstream that Traefik proxies allowed requests to.
 //
-// It is deliberately NOT a Crowdsec/AppSec conformance harness: Crowdsec's own
-// correctness is the upstream maintainer's responsibility, not this plugin's.
-// See the suite README.
+// It is NOT a Crowdsec/AppSec conformance harness — the real WAF engine (OWASP
+// CRS, virtual patching) is out of scope. The AppSec endpoint here emulates a
+// single deterministic rule so the suite can exercise the plugin's AppSec
+// wiring (header forwarding, allow/block handling) end to end. See the README.
 package main

 import (
@@ -14,6 +15,7 @@ import (
 	"flag"
 	"log"
 	"net/http"
+	"strings"
 	"sync"
 )

@@ -48,6 +50,8 @@ func main() {
 	// The stub upstream Traefik proxies allowed requests to — the binary-suite
 	// equivalent of the traefik/whoami container. Not AppSec.
 	backendAddr := flag.String("backend-addr", "127.0.0.1:8091", "address for the stub upstream service")
+	// AppSec WAF stand-in (the real engine listens on :7422). Not a CRS engine.
+	appsecAddr := flag.String("appsec-addr", "127.0.0.1:8092", "address for the AppSec mock")
 	flag.Parse()

 	go func() {
@@ -56,6 +60,19 @@ func main() {
 		})))
 	}()

+	// AppSec mock: the plugin forwards the request metadata in X-Crowdsec-Appsec-*
+	// headers and reads our status — 200 allows, 403 blocks. We emulate one
+	// deterministic virtual-patching rule (block any URI containing "rpc2", the
+	// exact probe from examples/appsec-enabled) so the plugin's AppSec path is
+	// exercised without standing up the real WAF.
+	go func() {
+		log.Fatal(http.ListenAndServe(*appsecAddr, http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+			if strings.Contains(r.Header.Get("X-Crowdsec-Appsec-Uri"), "rpc2") {
+				w.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
+			}
+		})))
+	}()
+
 	mux := http.NewServeMux()

 	// Readiness probe for the test harness (empty body, 200).
@@ -113,6 +130,6 @@ func main() {
 		}
 	})

-	log.Printf("mocklapi: LAPI on %s, backend on %s", *lapiAddr, *backendAddr)
+	log.Printf("mocklapi: LAPI on %s, backend on %s, appsec on %s", *lapiAddr, *backendAddr, *appsecAddr)
 	log.Fatal(http.ListenAndServe(*lapiAddr, mux))
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+http:
+  routers:
+    r:
+      rule: "PathPrefix(`/foo`)"
+      entryPoints:
+        - web
+      service: backend
+      middlewares:
+        - bouncer
+  services:
+    backend:
+      loadBalancer:
+        servers:
+          - url: "@@BACKEND_URL@@"
+  middlewares:
+    bouncer:
+      plugin:
+        bouncer:
+          enabled: "true"
+          # IP bouncing disabled — this scenario exercises AppSec only.
+          crowdsecMode: none
+          crowdsecLapiScheme: http
+          crowdsecLapiHost: "@@LAPI_HOST@@"
+          crowdsecLapiKey: "@@APIKEY@@"
+          crowdsecAppsecEnabled: "true"
+          crowdsecAppsecScheme: http
+          crowdsecAppsecHost: "@@APPSEC_HOST@@"
+          forwardedHeadersTrustedIps:
+            - "127.0.0.1/32"
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+set -euo pipefail
+
+HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
+# shellcheck source=../../lib/common.sh
+source "$HERE/../../lib/common.sh"
+
+SCENARIO=appsec
+
+# AppSec wiring check: the plugin forwards each request to the AppSec engine and
+# enforces its verdict. The mock emulates one virtual-patching rule (block any
+# URI containing "rpc2"), mirroring examples/appsec-enabled. This proves the
+# plugin's AppSec path end to end (header forwarding + allow/block handling); it
+# does not test the real WAF's detection accuracy.
+body() {
+  echo "[$SCENARIO] benign request must pass (AppSec allows)"
+  assert_status "http://127.0.0.1:${WEB_PORT}/foo" 200 -H "X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4"
+
+  echo "[$SCENARIO] request whose URI contains 'rpc2' must be blocked (AppSec 403)"
+  assert_status "http://127.0.0.1:${WEB_PORT}/foo/rpc2" 403 -H "X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4"
+}
+
+run_scenario "$SCENARIO" "$HERE" body
@@ -25,3 +25,4 @@ http:
          forwardedHeadersTrustedIps:
            - "127.0.0.1/32"
          banHtmlFilePath: "@@SCENARIO_DIR@@/ban.html"
+          remediationHeadersCustomName: "X-E2E-Remediation"
@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ body() {

  echo "[$SCENARIO] banned response body contains the custom marker"
  assert_body_contains "http://127.0.0.1:${WEB_PORT}/foo" "E2E_CUSTOM_BAN_PAGE_MARKER" -H "X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4"
+
+  echo "[$SCENARIO] banned response carries the custom remediation header (remediationHeadersCustomName)"
+  assert_header "http://127.0.0.1:${WEB_PORT}/foo" X-E2E-Remediation "ban" -H "X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4"
 }

 run_scenario "$SCENARIO" "$HERE" body