🐛 fall back to system trust store when no custom TLS CA is set (#331)

* 🐛 fall back to system trust store when no custom TLS CA is set

Closes #327.

Until now, configuring `crowdsecLapiScheme=https` forced the operator
to either provide `crowdsecLapiTLSCertificateAuthority` (a custom CA)
or set `crowdsecLapiTLSInsecureVerify=true` — there was no way to rely
on the host's system trust store, which is the expected setup when the
LAPI sits behind a reverse proxy with a publicly trusted (e.g. Let's
Encrypt) certificate.

Two contributing bugs:
  - `validateParamsTLS` rejected an empty CA up-front.
  - `getTLSConfig` always allocated an empty `tls.Config.RootCAs`,
    which silently disabled the standard library's fall-back to
    `x509.SystemCertPool()`.

Fix: drop the validation error for the empty-CA case and only allocate
`RootCAs` when a custom CA is actually provided. Same change applies
symmetrically to the AppSec path since the helper is shared.

Add unit tests covering the four meaningful states (HTTP, HTTPS with
system CA, HTTPS with custom CA, HTTPS with insecure verify) plus the
malformed-PEM rejection. README updated to document the system trust
store as an explicit option for both LAPI and AppSec HTTPS.

* 📝 fix gofmt alignment in TLS test struct

*  update existing test: https without CA is now accepted

* ♻️ tests: hoist shared validPEM to package level, rename cfgGarbage

Address review on #331:
- the self-signed validPEM block was duplicated in two test funcs; declare it
  once at package level and drop both local copies.
- rename cfgGarbage -> cfgInvalidCA (and its test case) for a descriptive name.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

*  e2e mock: add tls-system-ca scenario (HTTPS LAPI via system trust store)

CI regression coverage for this PR: with no custom CA configured, the bouncer
must fall back to the OS/system trust store for an HTTPS LAPI.

In the binary suite the "system trust store" is whatever Go's
x509.SystemCertPool() reads, which honours SSL_CERT_FILE on the Traefik process.
The scenario mints a throwaway CA, serves the mock LAPI over HTTPS with a cert
signed by it, and runs the stack twice:
  - positive: SSL_CERT_FILE = our CA       -> LAPI trusted    -> 200
  - negative: SSL_CERT_FILE = empty bundle  -> not trusted     -> 403 (fail-closed)
The negative run proves the patch still VERIFIES (not an insecure skip).

- mocklapi: optional --lapi-tls-cert/--lapi-tls-key to serve the LAPI over TLS.
- common.sh: opt-in LAPI_TLS_CERT/KEY (HTTPS mock) and TRAEFIK_SSL_CERT_FILE
  (inject SSL_CERT_FILE into Traefik); both default-empty, other scenarios
  unaffected.
- adds openssl as a scenario-only dependency.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
mathieuHa
2026-06-23 09:27:32 +02:00
committed by GitHub
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.8
parent 67b33dcf13
commit f4dcd933c8
9 changed files with 213 additions and 41 deletions
+11 -4
View File
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ that lives upstream in Crowdsec.
|-----------|-----|
| Traefik | Binary `v3.7.1`, downloaded into `.cache/` (reused across local runs; re-downloaded on fresh CI runners) |
| Plugin | Loaded via `experimental.localPlugins` from the repo root (symlinked into `plugins-local/`) |
| LAPI | `mocklapi` — a stdlib-only Go command (its own nested module), compiled and cached under `.cache/`, driven through `/admin` endpoints instead of `cscli` |
| LAPI | `mocklapi` — a stdlib-only Go command (its own nested module), compiled and cached under `.cache/`, driven through `/admin` endpoints instead of `cscli`. Serves plain HTTP, or HTTPS when `--lapi-tls-cert/--lapi-tls-key` are passed (the `tls-system-ca` scenario) |
| AppSec | WAF stand-in built into the mock — blocks URIs containing `rpc2`, allows the rest |
| Backend | A plain HTTP responder built into the mock |
@@ -39,9 +39,16 @@ backend `8091`, AppSec `8092`.
## Running locally
Prerequisites: `bash`, `curl`, `go`, `tar`. On first use the Traefik binary is
fetched and the mock is compiled into `.cache/`. That cache is reused across
local runs; CI runs on fresh runners, so both are recreated on every CI run.
Prerequisites: `bash`, `curl`, `go`, `tar` (plus `openssl` for the
`tls-system-ca` scenario, which mints a throwaway CA at runtime). On first use
the Traefik binary is fetched and the mock is compiled into `.cache/`. That
cache is reused across local runs; CI runs on fresh runners, so both are
recreated on every CI run.
The `tls-system-ca` scenario verifies that, with no custom CA configured, the
bouncer falls back to the OS/system trust store for an HTTPS LAPI: it serves the
mock over TLS and points the Traefik process's `SSL_CERT_FILE` at the test CA
(trusted → 200) or an empty bundle (untrusted → 403, proving it still verifies).
```bash
# one scenario
+16 -3
View File
@@ -190,16 +190,29 @@ start_stack() {
-e "s|@@SCENARIO_DIR@@|${scenario_dir}|g" \
"$scenario_dir/dynamic.yml" > "$WORKDIR/dynamic.yml"
# Opt-in HTTPS LAPI: a scenario exports LAPI_TLS_CERT/LAPI_TLS_KEY to serve the
# LAPI over TLS (used by tls-system-ca). Default empty -> plaintext as before.
local mock_tls_args=() lapi_scheme=http lapi_curl=()
if [[ -n "${LAPI_TLS_CERT:-}" && -n "${LAPI_TLS_KEY:-}" ]]; then
mock_tls_args=(--lapi-tls-cert "$LAPI_TLS_CERT" --lapi-tls-key "$LAPI_TLS_KEY")
lapi_scheme=https
lapi_curl=(-k) # the readiness probe ignores trust; the bouncer's trust is what we test
fi
"$mock_bin" \
--lapi-addr "127.0.0.1:${LAPI_PORT}" \
--backend-addr "127.0.0.1:${BACKEND_PORT}" \
--appsec-addr "127.0.0.1:${APPSEC_PORT}" >"$WORKDIR/mock.log" 2>&1 &
--appsec-addr "127.0.0.1:${APPSEC_PORT}" \
"${mock_tls_args[@]}" >"$WORKDIR/mock.log" 2>&1 &
MOCK_PID=$!
( cd "$WORKDIR" && exec "$traefik_bin" --configfile=traefik.yml ) >"$WORKDIR/traefik.log" 2>&1 &
# Opt-in trust store for the Traefik process: a scenario exports
# TRAEFIK_SSL_CERT_FILE to point Go's x509.SystemCertPool() at a specific CA
# bundle. Empty -> Go's default system store (unchanged behaviour).
( cd "$WORKDIR" && SSL_CERT_FILE="${TRAEFIK_SSL_CERT_FILE:-}" exec "$traefik_bin" --configfile=traefik.yml ) >"$WORKDIR/traefik.log" 2>&1 &
TRAEFIK_PID=$!
wait_for_status "http://127.0.0.1:${LAPI_PORT}/health" 200 30
wait_for_status "${lapi_scheme}://127.0.0.1:${LAPI_PORT}/health" 200 30 "${lapi_curl[@]}"
# AppSec stand-in: a bare GET carries no "rpc2" URI, so it answers 200 (allow).
wait_for_status "http://127.0.0.1:${APPSEC_PORT}/" 200 30
# /ping is served by Traefik itself once it is up (plugin compilation included).
+9
View File
@@ -52,6 +52,11 @@ func main() {
backendAddr := flag.String("backend-addr", "127.0.0.1:8091", "address for the stub upstream service")
// AppSec WAF stand-in (the real engine listens on :7422). Not a CRS engine.
appsecAddr := flag.String("appsec-addr", "127.0.0.1:8092", "address for the AppSec mock")
// Optional TLS for the LAPI: when both are set the LAPI is served over HTTPS
// (cert signed by the scenario's throwaway CA) so the suite can exercise the
// bouncer's system-trust-store path. Backend and AppSec stay plaintext.
lapiTLSCert := flag.String("lapi-tls-cert", "", "PEM cert to serve the LAPI over HTTPS (optional)")
lapiTLSKey := flag.String("lapi-tls-key", "", "PEM key for --lapi-tls-cert")
flag.Parse()
go func() {
@@ -130,6 +135,10 @@ func main() {
}
})
if *lapiTLSCert != "" && *lapiTLSKey != "" {
log.Printf("mocklapi: LAPI on %s (TLS), backend on %s, appsec on %s", *lapiAddr, *backendAddr, *appsecAddr)
log.Fatal(http.ListenAndServeTLS(*lapiAddr, *lapiTLSCert, *lapiTLSKey, mux))
}
log.Printf("mocklapi: LAPI on %s, backend on %s, appsec on %s", *lapiAddr, *backendAddr, *appsecAddr)
log.Fatal(http.ListenAndServe(*lapiAddr, mux))
}
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
http:
routers:
r:
rule: "PathPrefix(`/foo`)"
entryPoints:
- web
service: backend
middlewares:
- bouncer
services:
backend:
loadBalancer:
servers:
- url: "@@BACKEND_URL@@"
middlewares:
bouncer:
plugin:
bouncer:
enabled: "true"
crowdsecMode: live
defaultDecisionSeconds: "2"
# HTTPS LAPI with NO custom CA configured: the bouncer must fall back to
# the OS/system trust store (which the scenario controls via SSL_CERT_FILE).
crowdsecLapiScheme: https
crowdsecLapiHost: "@@LAPI_HOST@@"
crowdsecLapiKey: "@@APIKEY@@"
forwardedHeadersTrustedIps:
- "127.0.0.1/32"
+66
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Scenario: HTTPS LAPI with no custom CA configured -> the bouncer must fall back
# to the OS/system trust store (PR #331). In the binary suite the "system trust
# store" is whatever Go's x509.SystemCertPool() reads, which honours SSL_CERT_FILE
# on the Traefik process. We mint a throwaway CA, serve the mock LAPI over HTTPS
# with a cert signed by it, and run the stack twice:
#
# positive: SSL_CERT_FILE = our CA -> LAPI trusted -> 200
# negative: SSL_CERT_FILE = empty bundle -> LAPI not trusted -> 403
#
# live mode is fail-closed, so a TLS error becomes a 403. The negative run proves
# the patch still VERIFIES (it is not an insecure skip).
#
# Extra dependency vs other scenarios: openssl.
set -euo pipefail
HERE="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"
# shellcheck source=../../lib/common.sh
source "$HERE/../../lib/common.sh"
SCENARIO=tls-system-ca
SCENARIO_NAME="$SCENARIO"
SCENARIO_LOG="/tmp/e2e-mock-${SCENARIO}.log"
CERT_DIR="$(mktemp -d)"
cleanup() {
local rc=$?
if (( rc != 0 )); then
dump_diagnostics > "$SCENARIO_LOG" 2>&1 || true
echo "[$SCENARIO] failed. Logs written to $SCENARIO_LOG" >&2
fi
stop_stack
rm -rf "$CERT_DIR"
exit $rc
}
trap cleanup EXIT
echo "[$SCENARIO] minting throwaway CA + LAPI cert (SAN=IP:127.0.0.1)..."
openssl ecparam -name prime256v1 -genkey -noout -out "$CERT_DIR/ca.key" 2>/dev/null
openssl req -x509 -new -key "$CERT_DIR/ca.key" -sha256 -days 3650 \
-subj "/CN=crowdsec-bouncer e2e test CA" -out "$CERT_DIR/ca.crt" 2>/dev/null
openssl ecparam -name prime256v1 -genkey -noout -out "$CERT_DIR/lapi.key" 2>/dev/null
openssl req -new -key "$CERT_DIR/lapi.key" -subj "/CN=lapi" -out "$CERT_DIR/lapi.csr" 2>/dev/null
openssl x509 -req -in "$CERT_DIR/lapi.csr" -CA "$CERT_DIR/ca.crt" -CAkey "$CERT_DIR/ca.key" \
-CAcreateserial -days 3650 -sha256 -out "$CERT_DIR/lapi.crt" \
-extfile <(printf "subjectAltName=IP:127.0.0.1\nbasicConstraints=CA:FALSE\nkeyUsage=digitalSignature,keyEncipherment\nextendedKeyUsage=serverAuth") 2>/dev/null
: > "$CERT_DIR/empty.crt" # an empty bundle = a system store that trusts nothing
# The mock serves the same CA-signed cert in both runs; only Traefik's trust differs.
export LAPI_TLS_CERT="$CERT_DIR/lapi.crt" LAPI_TLS_KEY="$CERT_DIR/lapi.key"
echo "[$SCENARIO] === positive: CA in the system trust store ==="
export TRAEFIK_SSL_CERT_FILE="$CERT_DIR/ca.crt"
start_stack "$HERE"
echo "[$SCENARIO] HTTPS LAPI verifies via system trust store -> request passes (200)"
assert_status "http://127.0.0.1:${WEB_PORT}/foo" 200 -H "X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4"
stop_stack
echo "[$SCENARIO] === negative: CA absent from the system trust store ==="
export TRAEFIK_SSL_CERT_FILE="$CERT_DIR/empty.crt"
start_stack "$HERE"
echo "[$SCENARIO] LAPI cert not trusted -> TLS fails, fail-closed (403)"
assert_status "http://127.0.0.1:${WEB_PORT}/foo" 403 -H "X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4"
stop_stack
echo "[$SCENARIO] OK"