CIDRKeys masked the address byte by byte and formatted the result with
string concatenation, while SetCIDR/DeleteCIDR format their keys with
net.IPNet.String() via NormalizeCIDR. The two agreed only by coincidence:
any divergence in formatting silently stops every range decision from
matching, with no test covering the invariant.
Mask with net.IP.Mask and format through net.IPNet.String() so both sides
go through the same formatter. Output is byte for byte identical to the
previous implementation (checked against a golden dump of both IPv4 and
IPv6 keys, including ::ffff: forms).
Dropping the inner byte loops also removes the only intrange violation in
the tree, so the linter exclusion added for them is no longer needed, and
the redundant import alias on pkg/ip goes away with it.
* feat: Allow cache reading from replicas
* 🍱 fix logic
* ✨ add testing for redis with mock
* 🍱 fix permission
* 📝 test(e2e/redis): fix swapped IP→verdict comments
The mock returns "f" (not banned) for 1.2.3.4 and "t" (banned) for
1.2.3.5, and the run.sh assertions match that. Both doc comments
described the opposite mapping; correct them to match the code.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* ✅ test(e2e/redis): exercise read-from-replica path
The redis scenario only set redisCacheHost, so it validated the writer
but never the round-robin reader path this feature adds. Split the mock
into two roles: the primary (--redis-addr) now answers every GET with a
miss, while the replica (--redis-read-addr) serves the hardcoded
verdicts. The scenario points redisCacheReadHosts at the replica (twice,
to drive round-robin), so the banned-IP-blocked assertion only passes if
the plugin actually reads decisions from the replica rather than the
primary.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* 📝 docs: note replicas don't fall back to primary on outage
When RedisCacheReadHosts is set, reads are not retried against the
primary if the replicas are unreachable. Document that this, combined
with the default RedisCacheUnreachableBlock=true, means a replica outage
can block traffic while the primary is healthy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* 🐛 fix(cache): avoid nil-pointer panic on empty redis read
redisCache.get fell through to `switch err.Error()` when Get returned a
nil error with an empty value, panicking on the nil error. simpleredis
never returns that combination today (a miss yields RedisMiss), so it
was unreachable in practice — but the read path is safer treating an
empty, error-free read as a cache miss, which also guarantees err is
non-nil before err.Error() is called.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* 🍱 add test for rotation
* 🐛 readd redis/run.sh
* 🐛 fix redis/run.sh
* 🐛 fix test label; remove log
* 🍱 add tests for roundRobin
* 🐛 fix test
---------
Co-authored-by: maxlerebourg <maxlerebourg@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: mhx <mathieu@hanotaux.fr>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* 🐛 fix appsec silently 403-ing gRPC streams with unreadable body
A bidirectional gRPC stream is an HTTP/2 request with no Content-Length
whose body never reaches EOF. Since #321 removed the ContentLength guard,
appsecQuery buffered it with io.ReadAll, which blocked until the request
timed out and was turned into a 403 (issue #323). The backend was never
reached (OriginStatus:0).
Mirror the reference lua-cs-bouncer behaviour: detect an unreadable body
(ProtoMajor >= 2 && ContentLength < 0) and, instead of buffering it,
forward the request to Appsec with headers only. Add a new
CrowdsecAppsecDropUnreadableBody option (default false) that mirrors the
reference APPSEC_DROP_UNREADABLE_BODY: when true, such requests are
blocked outright instead of forwarded without their body.
Readable HTTP/1.1 bodies are still buffered and inspected, so the bypass
closed by #321 stays closed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* 🚨 appsec: satisfy linters (gocritic ifElseChain, misspell)
Rewrite the body-handling if/else chain in appsecQuery as a switch
(gocritic) and use US spelling "behavior" (misspell).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* 🔇 appsec: drop redundant unreadable-body debug log
Address review on #332: the caller (handleNextServeHTTP) already logs the
returned error with the request IP, so the inner Debug line duplicated it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* 🍱 increase gocyclo
* 🍱 fix lint
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: maxlerebourg <maxlerebourg@gmail.com>
* ✨ Add support for insecure tls connections to LAPI
* 📝 Add documentation for the TLS insecure parameter
* 🚧 Add tls authority certificate and checks for params
* 📝 Add example for tls communication in readme and folder
* 📝 Update documentation and example for tls
* 🚨 Fix easy lint errors
* 🦺 logic to fetch certificates
* 🚨 Fix lint on readme
* ♻️ Refactor validate to fix lint and clean
* 🚧 Add doc, cert gen for crowdsec example
* 🚧 Progress on setting up Crowdsec with tls
* 🚧 Update certs validation for example
* ♻️ Add load variable from file or value and get client cert
* ♻️ Refactor getting variables
* 🚨 Fix lint, no new line on new files
* 🐛 Fix bug on condition check lapi key cert
* ♻️ Update after review
* ♻️ Update after review
* 🍱 fix mathieu code
* ♻️ Refactor logic of loading tls certificates
* 🍱 clean code
* 🍱 last fix
* 🍱 fix lint
* ♻️ Add documentation in readme, fix lint, remove unfinished tests
* 🐛 Fix conditions logics
* 🚨 Fix Lint
* ♻️ simplify code on getVariable
Co-authored-by: Max Lerebourg <maxlerebourg@gmail.com>
mhx