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Author SHA1 Message Date
mhxandClaude Opus 5 93cd13bc10 🔥 e2e: drop the comment above wait_for_status
The timeout change in 3f78887 stands; only the comment goes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-07 20:14:58 +02:00
mhxandClaude Opus 5 9f99c431c3 e2e: restore the stream-mode failure check
Revert 99673b1. The check is not ours to change: it must stay as it was.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-07 20:14:55 +02:00
mhx 3f78887e3a 🐛 e2e: do not fail a scenario on a single slow response
The new -m 1 is right for the polling helpers, where a timed out request is
just another attempt, but the assertions and the mock control plane have no
retry: one request that takes over a second on a loaded runner fails the
scenario, and since common.sh runs under set -euo pipefail a timed out
lapi_add_decision aborts it before the decision even exists.

Bound the connect at 1s instead and give the whole request 5s in the seven
places that get a single attempt. Nothing waits longer on the happy path.
2026-08-03 13:56:04 +02:00
mhx 99673b1087 🐛 e2e: stop racing the deadline in the stream failure check
handleStreamTicker compares updateFailure to updateMaxFailure before
incrementing it, so with updateMaxFailure 2 and a 1s interval the bouncer
gives up on the third consecutive failed poll, roughly 3s after the
endpoint starts failing. The check slept 2s and then polled for a 200 for
up to 15s, leaving about a second of margin, and once that window closes it
never reopens: a runner under load turns this into a 15s wait followed by a
failure.

Assert the 200 immediately after the endpoint starts failing, which is
always inside the window, and keep polling for the 403 that follows.
2026-08-03 13:56:04 +02:00
mhx 4bac63ca83 cache: cover the CIDR operations and what a lookup costs
pkg/cache had tests for Get, Set and Delete but none for their CIDR
counterparts, so the range keyspace was only exercised end to end by the
e2e scenario.

Test_GetCIDR covers hits, the boundaries of a range, IPv6, IPv4 mapped
clients and invalid input. Test_GetCIDR_MostSpecific pins the precedence
between overlapping decisions, which is deliberate behaviour that nothing
was holding in place: a captcha on a /24 is not overruled by a ban on its
/8. Test_DeleteCIDR checks the wider decision survives a narrower one being
removed, and Test_SetCIDR_InvalidIsNotStored that a rejected value stores
nothing at all.

Test_GetCIDR_Reads counts cache reads through an isolated cacheInterface,
so the cost of a lookup is part of the contract: probing every prefix
length again turns it into 34 reads for IPv4 and 130 for IPv6 and fails.
2026-08-03 13:56:04 +02:00
mhx b1562ef2b9 cidr: cover the invariant the range matching rests on
The helpers were tested in isolation but nothing tied them together, and
what actually has to hold is that the key SetCIDR writes for a decision is
one of the keys GetCIDR looks up for an IP that decision covers. A
formatting change on either side would have silently stopped every range
decision from matching with all tests green.

TestCIDRKeys_MatchNormalizeCIDR pins that both ways, including the cases
worth being explicit about: a decision that is not on a network address,
IPv4 mapped clients against an IPv4 range, and that the two families do not
mix. Dropping the mask in cidrKey fails 9 of its cases.

Also covers CIDRLookupKeys against CIDRKeys length by length, the IPv6 side
of the network address test, and CIDRPrefixLen.
2026-08-03 13:41:11 +02:00
mhx 3b7168a789 🔊 cidr: log the decisions dropped for an unparsable CIDR
SetCIDR and DeleteCIDR returned silently when NormalizeCIDR rejected the
value, so a range decision the plugin does not understand is not enforced
and nothing says why. Every other operation of the package logs, and this
one fails open, which is the direction worth shouting about.

Log at Error with the raw value and what the consequence is, so an
unexpected decision format shows up in the logs instead of looking like a
decision that was applied.
2026-08-03 13:40:44 +02:00
mhx adffe64319 cidr: only probe the prefix lengths that have a decision
In stream mode nothing caches a negative result per IP, so the exact IP
lookup misses on every legitimate request and each one fell through to
GetCIDR, which probed every possible prefix length: 33 cache reads for an
IPv4 client, 129 for an IPv6 one, even when no range decision existed at
all. On the local cache that is wasted work on the request path; with
redis it is 33 to 129 sequential round trips per request.

Keep the set of prefix lengths that have at least one decision under a
single key, written before the decision itself, and probe only those.
Measured cache reads per request: 1 with no range decision (was 33 / 129),
2 with a single /24 in use, 4 with four prefix lengths in use.

The set only grows, so a deleted or expired decision leaves a length
behind that costs one extra read rather than risking an unmatched
decision, and it is written with an effectively infinite duration since it
has to outlive every decision it describes. If it is ever missing while
decisions live (a redis eviction under maxmemory), range decisions stop
matching until the next one arrives; it is the hottest key of the
namespace, so an LRU policy evicts it last.
2026-08-03 13:40:41 +02:00
mhx 1b1247823c ♻️ cidr: build keys through net.IPNet instead of hand-masking bytes
CIDRKeys masked the address byte by byte and formatted the result with
string concatenation, while SetCIDR/DeleteCIDR format their keys with
net.IPNet.String() via NormalizeCIDR. The two agreed only by coincidence:
any divergence in formatting silently stops every range decision from
matching, with no test covering the invariant.

Mask with net.IP.Mask and format through net.IPNet.String() so both sides
go through the same formatter. Output is byte for byte identical to the
previous implementation (checked against a golden dump of both IPv4 and
IPv6 keys, including ::ffff: forms).

Dropping the inner byte loops also removes the only intrange violation in
the tree, so the linter exclusion added for them is no longer needed, and
the redundant import alias on pkg/ip goes away with it.
2026-08-03 13:39:53 +02:00
maxlerebourg 1ba556e918 🍱 fix lint 2026-07-31 14:39:09 +02:00
maxlerebourg 6b0518859d 🐛 Support range decision on stream mode 2026-07-31 14:08:59 +02:00
10 changed files with 749 additions and 18 deletions
+19 -1
View File
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ func New(_ context.Context, next http.Handler, config *configuration.Config, nam
// ServeHTTP principal function of plugin.
//
//nolint:nestif
//nolint:nestif,gocognit
func (bouncer *Bouncer) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
if !bouncer.enabled {
bouncer.next.ServeHTTP(rw, req)
@@ -392,6 +392,16 @@ func (bouncer *Bouncer) ServeHTTP(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
// Right here if we cannot join the stream we forbid the request to go on.
if bouncer.crowdsecMode == configuration.StreamMode || bouncer.crowdsecMode == configuration.AloneMode {
if isCrowdsecStreamHealthy {
cidrValue, cidrErr := bouncer.cacheClient.GetCIDR(remoteIP)
if cidrErr == nil {
bouncer.log.Debug(fmt.Sprintf("ServeHTTP ip:%s cidr:hit isBanned:%v", remoteIP, cidrValue))
if cidrValue == cache.NoBannedValue {
bouncer.handleNextServeHTTP(rw, req, remoteIP)
} else {
bouncer.handleRemediationServeHTTP(rw, req, remoteIP, cidrValue)
}
return
}
bouncer.handleNextServeHTTP(rw, req, remoteIP)
} else {
bouncer.log.Debug(fmt.Sprintf("ServeHTTP isCrowdsecStreamHealthy:false ip:%s updateFailure:%d", remoteIP, updateFailure))
@@ -669,12 +679,20 @@ func handleStreamCache(bouncer *Bouncer) error {
default:
bouncer.log.Info("handleStreamCache:unknownType " + decision.Type)
}
if strings.Contains(decision.Value, "/") {
bouncer.cacheClient.SetCIDR(decision.Value, value, int64(duration.Seconds()))
} else {
bouncer.cacheClient.Set(decision.Value, value, int64(duration.Seconds()))
}
}
}
for _, decision := range stream.Deleted {
if strings.Contains(decision.Value, "/") {
bouncer.cacheClient.DeleteCIDR(decision.Value)
} else {
bouncer.cacheClient.Delete(decision.Value)
}
}
bouncer.log.Debug("handleStreamCache:updated")
isCrowdsecStreamStartup = false
return nil
+87
View File
@@ -6,10 +6,14 @@ import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"strconv"
"strings"
"sync/atomic"
ttl_map "github.com/leprosus/golang-ttl-map"
simpleredis "github.com/maxlerebourg/simpleredis"
"github.com/maxlerebourg/crowdsec-bouncer-traefik-plugin/pkg/ip"
)
const (
@@ -25,6 +29,17 @@ const (
CacheMiss = "cache:miss"
// CacheUnreachable error string when cache is unreachable.
CacheUnreachable = "cache:unreachable"
// cidrPrefix namespaces a CIDR decision, one cache key per CIDR.
cidrPrefix = "cidr:"
// cidrPrefixLensKey holds the prefix lengths that have a decision, so a lookup probes
// only those. Its absence means no CIDR decision was ever stored.
cidrPrefixLensKey = "cidrprefixlens"
// cidrPrefixLensSeparator separates the prefix lengths in cidrPrefixLensKey.
cidrPrefixLensSeparator = ","
// cidrPrefixLensDuration has to outlive every decision it describes, so it is
// effectively infinite. It cannot be zero: the local cache ignores a zero duration
// and redis rejects a non positive EX.
cidrPrefixLensDuration = 10 * 365 * 24 * 60 * 60
)
//nolint:gochecknoglobals
@@ -144,3 +159,75 @@ func (c *Client) Set(key string, value string, duration int64) {
c.log.Debug(fmt.Sprintf("cache:Set key:%v value:%v duration:%vs", key, value, duration))
c.cache.set(key, value, duration)
}
// DeleteCIDR removes a CIDR decision from the cache.
func (c *Client) DeleteCIDR(cidr string) {
normalized := ip.NormalizeCIDR(cidr)
if normalized == "" {
c.log.Error(fmt.Sprintf("cache:DeleteCIDR:invalidCIDR cidr:%v decision is left in cache", cidr))
return
}
cidr = normalized
c.cache.delete(cidrPrefix + cidr)
c.log.Debug(fmt.Sprintf("cache:DeleteCIDR cidr:%v", cidr))
}
// GetCIDR checks if an IP matches a CIDR decision in the cache.
// Only probes the prefix lengths that have a decision: it is on the request path.
func (c *Client) GetCIDR(ipStr string) (string, error) {
prefixLens, err := c.cache.get(cidrPrefixLensKey)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
for _, key := range ip.CIDRLookupKeys(ipStr, parsePrefixLens(prefixLens)) {
value, getErr := c.cache.get(cidrPrefix + key)
if getErr == nil {
return value, nil
}
}
return "", errors.New(CacheMiss)
}
// SetCIDR stores a CIDR decision in the cache.
func (c *Client) SetCIDR(cidr, value string, duration int64) {
normalized := ip.NormalizeCIDR(cidr)
prefixLen := ip.CIDRPrefixLen(cidr)
if normalized == "" || prefixLen < 0 {
c.log.Error(fmt.Sprintf("cache:SetCIDR:invalidCIDR cidr:%v value:%v decision is not enforced", cidr, value))
return
}
// Publish the length first, or a concurrent lookup misses the decision.
c.addCIDRPrefixLen(prefixLen)
c.cache.set(cidrPrefix+normalized, value, duration)
c.log.Debug(fmt.Sprintf("cache:SetCIDR cidr:%v value:%v duration:%vs", normalized, value, duration))
}
// addCIDRPrefixLen records a prefix length in the set probed on lookup. The set only grows:
// a stale length costs one extra read, dropping one too early leaves decisions unmatched.
func (c *Client) addCIDRPrefixLen(prefixLen int) {
prefixLens, err := c.cache.get(cidrPrefixLensKey)
if err == nil {
for _, known := range parsePrefixLens(prefixLens) {
if known == prefixLen {
return
}
}
prefixLens += cidrPrefixLensSeparator + strconv.Itoa(prefixLen)
} else {
prefixLens = strconv.Itoa(prefixLen)
}
c.cache.set(cidrPrefixLensKey, prefixLens, cidrPrefixLensDuration)
c.log.Debug(fmt.Sprintf("cache:addCIDRPrefixLen prefixLens:%v", prefixLens))
}
// parsePrefixLens decodes the set of prefix lengths stored in cidrPrefixLensKey.
func parsePrefixLens(value string) []int {
fields := strings.Split(value, cidrPrefixLensSeparator)
prefixLens := make([]int, 0, len(fields))
for _, field := range fields {
if prefixLen, err := strconv.Atoi(field); err == nil {
prefixLens = append(prefixLens, prefixLen)
}
}
return prefixLens
}
+184
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
package cache
import (
"errors"
"testing"
logger "github.com/maxlerebourg/crowdsec-bouncer-traefik-plugin/pkg/logger"
@@ -160,3 +161,186 @@ func Test_nextReader(t *testing.T) {
})
}
}
// countingCache is an isolated cacheInterface recording how many reads a lookup costs,
// so a CIDR lookup can be checked for both its result and its price.
type countingCache struct {
values map[string]string
reads int
}
func newCountingCache() *countingCache {
return &countingCache{values: map[string]string{}}
}
func (c *countingCache) get(key string) (string, error) {
c.reads++
if value, found := c.values[key]; found && value != "" {
return value, nil
}
return "", errors.New(CacheMiss)
}
func (c *countingCache) set(key, value string, _ int64) {
c.values[key] = value
}
func (c *countingCache) delete(key string) {
delete(c.values, key)
}
func newCIDRClient(decisions map[string]string) (*Client, *countingCache) {
counting := newCountingCache()
client := &Client{cache: counting, log: logger.New("INFO", "")}
for cidr, value := range decisions {
client.SetCIDR(cidr, value, 60)
}
return client, counting
}
func Test_GetCIDR(t *testing.T) {
decisions := map[string]string{
"10.0.0.0/24": BannedValue,
"192.168.1.42/24": CaptchaValue, // not a network address, host bits are dropped
"2001:db8::/32": BannedValue,
}
tests := []struct {
name string
clientIP string
want string
wantErr bool
}{
{name: "IP inside a banned range", clientIP: "10.0.0.7", want: BannedValue},
{name: "network address itself", clientIP: "10.0.0.0", want: BannedValue},
{name: "broadcast address of the range", clientIP: "10.0.0.255", want: BannedValue},
{name: "IP just outside the range", clientIP: "10.0.1.0", wantErr: true},
{name: "IP inside a captcha range", clientIP: "192.168.1.7", want: CaptchaValue},
{name: "IP inside an IPv6 range", clientIP: "2001:db8::dead:beef", want: BannedValue},
{name: "IP outside the IPv6 range", clientIP: "2001:db9::1", wantErr: true},
{name: "IPv4 mapped client against an IPv4 range", clientIP: "::ffff:10.0.0.7", want: BannedValue},
{name: "unknown IP", clientIP: "8.8.8.8", wantErr: true},
{name: "invalid IP", clientIP: "not-an-ip", wantErr: true},
{name: "empty IP", clientIP: "", wantErr: true},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
client, _ := newCIDRClient(decisions)
got, err := client.GetCIDR(tt.clientIP)
if (err != nil) != tt.wantErr {
t.Fatalf("GetCIDR(%q) error = %v, wantErr %v", tt.clientIP, err, tt.wantErr)
}
if got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("GetCIDR(%q) = %q, want %q", tt.clientIP, got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
// Test_GetCIDR_MostSpecific pins precedence: the narrowest range wins, so a captcha on
// a /24 is not overruled by a ban on its /8.
func Test_GetCIDR_MostSpecific(t *testing.T) {
client, _ := newCIDRClient(map[string]string{
"10.0.0.0/8": BannedValue,
"10.1.0.0/16": CaptchaValue,
"10.1.2.0/24": BannedValue,
"2001:db8::/32": BannedValue,
"2001:db8::/48": CaptchaValue,
})
tests := []struct {
clientIP string
want string
}{
{clientIP: "10.1.2.3", want: BannedValue},
{clientIP: "10.1.3.3", want: CaptchaValue},
{clientIP: "10.2.3.4", want: BannedValue},
{clientIP: "2001:db8::1", want: CaptchaValue},
{clientIP: "2001:db8:1::1", want: BannedValue},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.clientIP, func(t *testing.T) {
got, err := client.GetCIDR(tt.clientIP)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GetCIDR(%q) unexpected error %v", tt.clientIP, err)
}
if got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("GetCIDR(%q) = %q, want %q", tt.clientIP, got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
func Test_DeleteCIDR(t *testing.T) {
client, _ := newCIDRClient(map[string]string{
"10.0.0.0/8": BannedValue,
"10.1.2.0/24": CaptchaValue,
})
client.DeleteCIDR("10.1.2.0/24")
// The wider decision is untouched and takes over.
if got, err := client.GetCIDR("10.1.2.3"); err != nil || got != BannedValue {
t.Errorf("after deleting the /24, GetCIDR = %q %v, want %q", got, err, BannedValue)
}
client.DeleteCIDR("10.0.0.0/8")
if _, err := client.GetCIDR("10.1.2.3"); err == nil {
t.Error("GetCIDR should miss once every decision is deleted")
}
}
func Test_SetCIDR_InvalidIsNotStored(t *testing.T) {
for _, cidr := range []string{"", "garbage", "10.0.0.1", "10.0.0.0/33", "10.0.0.0/-1"} {
t.Run(cidr, func(t *testing.T) {
_, counting := newCIDRClient(map[string]string{cidr: BannedValue})
if len(counting.values) != 0 {
t.Errorf("SetCIDR(%q) stored %v, want nothing", cidr, counting.values)
}
})
}
}
// Test_GetCIDR_Reads guards the cost of the lookup: it must probe only the prefix
// lengths that have a decision, not every possible one.
func Test_GetCIDR_Reads(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
decisions map[string]string
clientIP string
wantReads int
}{
{name: "no decision at all, IPv4", decisions: nil, clientIP: "10.0.0.1", wantReads: 1},
{name: "no decision at all, IPv6", decisions: nil, clientIP: "2001:db8::1", wantReads: 1},
{
name: "one prefix length, hit",
decisions: map[string]string{"10.0.0.0/24": BannedValue},
clientIP: "10.0.0.1",
wantReads: 2,
},
{
name: "one prefix length, miss",
decisions: map[string]string{"10.0.0.0/24": BannedValue},
clientIP: "11.0.0.1",
wantReads: 2,
},
{
name: "three prefix lengths, miss probes each once",
decisions: map[string]string{"10.0.0.0/8": BannedValue, "10.1.0.0/16": BannedValue, "10.1.2.0/24": BannedValue},
clientIP: "11.0.0.1",
wantReads: 4,
},
{
name: "IPv6 client does not probe every length",
decisions: map[string]string{"2001:db8::/32": BannedValue},
clientIP: "2001:dead::1",
wantReads: 2,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
client, counting := newCIDRClient(tt.decisions)
counting.reads = 0
// Only the number of reads matters here, the result is covered above.
_, _ = client.GetCIDR(tt.clientIP)
if counting.reads != tt.wantReads {
t.Errorf("GetCIDR(%q) did %d cache reads, want %d", tt.clientIP, counting.reads, tt.wantReads)
}
})
}
}
+85
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
package ip
import (
"net"
"strings"
)
const (
maxIPv4PrefixLen = 32
maxIPv6PrefixLen = 128
)
// CIDRKeys returns all possible CIDR prefixes of an IP, from the most specific (/32 for IPv4, /128 for IPv6) to the least specific (/0).
func CIDRKeys(ipStr string) []string {
parsed, maxBits := parseForPrefix(ipStr)
if parsed == nil {
return nil
}
keys := make([]string, 0, maxBits+1)
for bits := maxBits; bits >= 0; bits-- {
keys = append(keys, cidrKey(parsed, bits, maxBits))
}
return keys
}
// CIDRLookupKeys returns the keys of the CIDRs containing an IP for the given prefix lengths
// only, most specific first. Duplicates and lengths of the other family are skipped.
func CIDRLookupKeys(ipStr string, prefixLens []int) []string {
parsed, maxBits := parseForPrefix(ipStr)
if parsed == nil {
return nil
}
var wanted [maxIPv6PrefixLen + 1]bool
for _, bits := range prefixLens {
if bits >= 0 && bits <= maxBits {
wanted[bits] = true
}
}
keys := make([]string, 0, len(prefixLens))
for bits := maxBits; bits >= 0; bits-- {
if wanted[bits] {
keys = append(keys, cidrKey(parsed, bits, maxBits))
}
}
return keys
}
// NormalizeCIDR parses a CIDR string and returns its normalized form, or an empty string if invalid.
func NormalizeCIDR(cidrStr string) string {
_, ipNet, err := net.ParseCIDR(strings.TrimSpace(cidrStr))
if err != nil {
return ""
}
return ipNet.String()
}
// CIDRPrefixLen returns the prefix length of a CIDR, or -1 if it is not a valid CIDR.
func CIDRPrefixLen(cidrStr string) int {
_, ipNet, err := net.ParseCIDR(strings.TrimSpace(cidrStr))
if err != nil {
return -1
}
prefixLen, _ := ipNet.Mask.Size()
return prefixLen
}
// parseForPrefix returns the IP in the native form of its family, and that family's bit length.
func parseForPrefix(ipStr string) (net.IP, int) {
parsed := net.ParseIP(ipStr)
if parsed == nil {
return nil, 0
}
if parsed4 := parsed.To4(); parsed4 != nil {
return parsed4, maxIPv4PrefixLen
}
return parsed.To16(), maxIPv6PrefixLen
}
// cidrKey builds the key of the CIDR of bits length containing the IP.
// It formats through net.IPNet like NormalizeCIDR, so writes and lookups agree.
func cidrKey(parsed net.IP, bits, maxBits int) string {
mask := net.CIDRMask(bits, maxBits)
ipNet := net.IPNet{IP: parsed.Mask(mask), Mask: mask}
return ipNet.String()
}
+301
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,301 @@
package ip
import (
"strconv"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestCIDRKeys(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
ip string
wantKeys int
checks map[int]string
}{
{
ip: "10.0.0.1",
wantKeys: 33,
checks: map[int]string{0: "10.0.0.1/32", 8: "10.0.0.0/24", 32: "0.0.0.0/0"},
},
{
ip: "2001:db8::1",
wantKeys: 129,
checks: map[int]string{0: "2001:db8::1/128", 32: "2001:db8::/96", 128: "::/0"},
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.ip, func(t *testing.T) {
keys := CIDRKeys(tt.ip)
if keys == nil {
t.Fatal("CIDRKeys returned nil")
}
if len(keys) != tt.wantKeys {
t.Fatalf("expected %d keys, got %d", tt.wantKeys, len(keys))
}
for idx, want := range tt.checks {
if keys[idx] != want {
t.Errorf("keys[%d] should be %s, got %s", idx, want, keys[idx])
}
}
})
}
}
func TestCIDRKeys_MostToLeastSpecific(t *testing.T) {
ips := []string{"10.0.0.1", "2001:db8::1"}
for _, ip := range ips {
t.Run(ip, func(t *testing.T) {
keys := CIDRKeys(ip)
for i := 1; i < len(keys); i++ {
prevBits := strings.Split(keys[i-1], "/")[1]
curBits := strings.Split(keys[i], "/")[1]
prevN, _ := strconv.Atoi(prevBits)
curN, _ := strconv.Atoi(curBits)
if prevN <= curN {
t.Errorf("keys should go from most specific to least specific at index %d: /%d <= /%d", i, prevN, curN)
}
}
})
}
}
func TestCIDRKeys_IPVariants(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
ip string
wantKeys int
}{
{"0.0.0.0", 33},
{"255.255.255.255", 33},
{"1.2.3.4", 33},
{"10.0.0.1", 33},
{"192.168.1.1", 33},
{"invalid", 0},
{"", 0},
{" ", 0},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.ip, func(t *testing.T) {
keys := CIDRKeys(tt.ip)
if len(keys) != tt.wantKeys {
t.Errorf("CIDRKeys(%q) returned %d keys, want %d", tt.ip, len(keys), tt.wantKeys)
}
})
}
}
func TestCIDRKeys_VerifyNetworkAddress(t *testing.T) {
keys := CIDRKeys("10.1.2.3")
tests := []struct {
bits int
want string
}{
{24, "10.1.2.0/24"},
{16, "10.1.0.0/16"},
{8, "10.0.0.0/8"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
if got := keys[32-tt.bits]; got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("/%d network should be %s, got %s", tt.bits, tt.want, got)
}
}
}
func TestCIDRKeys_VerifyNetworkAddressIPv6(t *testing.T) {
keys := CIDRKeys("2001:db8:1:2:3:4:5:6")
tests := []struct {
bits int
want string
}{
{64, "2001:db8:1:2::/64"},
{48, "2001:db8:1::/48"},
{32, "2001:db8::/32"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
if got := keys[128-tt.bits]; got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("/%d network should be %s, got %s", tt.bits, tt.want, got)
}
}
}
// TestCIDRKeys_MatchNormalizeCIDR covers the invariant range support rests on: the key
// written for a decision is a key looked up for the IPs it covers, and only those.
func TestCIDRKeys_MatchNormalizeCIDR(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
cidr string
ip string
match bool
}{
{cidr: "10.0.0.0/8", ip: "10.1.2.3", match: true},
{cidr: "10.0.0.0/24", ip: "10.0.0.1", match: true},
{cidr: "10.0.0.0/24", ip: "10.0.1.1", match: false},
{cidr: "1.2.3.4/32", ip: "1.2.3.4", match: true},
{cidr: "1.2.3.4/32", ip: "1.2.3.5", match: false},
{cidr: "0.0.0.0/0", ip: "8.8.8.8", match: true},
// LAPI does not have to send a network address, the host bits are dropped.
{cidr: "10.0.0.5/24", ip: "10.0.0.9", match: true},
{cidr: " 192.168.1.0/24 ", ip: "192.168.1.42", match: true},
{cidr: "2001:db8::/32", ip: "2001:db8::1", match: true},
{cidr: "2001:db8::/32", ip: "2001:db9::1", match: false},
{cidr: "::/0", ip: "2001:db8::1", match: true},
// An IPv4 range and an IPv4 mapped client still have to meet.
{cidr: "10.0.0.0/8", ip: "::ffff:10.1.2.3", match: true},
{cidr: "::ffff:10.0.0.0/104", ip: "10.1.2.3", match: true},
// Families do not mix.
{cidr: "::/0", ip: "8.8.8.8", match: false},
{cidr: "2001:db8::/32", ip: "::ffff:10.0.0.1", match: false},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.cidr+"_"+tt.ip, func(t *testing.T) {
key := NormalizeCIDR(tt.cidr)
if key == "" {
t.Fatalf("NormalizeCIDR(%q) returned nothing", tt.cidr)
}
found := false
for _, candidate := range CIDRKeys(tt.ip) {
if candidate == key {
found = true
break
}
}
if found != tt.match {
t.Errorf("key %q of %q found in CIDRKeys(%q) = %v, want %v", key, tt.cidr, tt.ip, found, tt.match)
}
})
}
}
func TestCIDRLookupKeys(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
name string
ip string
prefixLens []int
want []string
}{
{
name: "most specific first",
ip: "10.1.2.3",
prefixLens: []int{8, 32, 16},
want: []string{"10.1.2.3/32", "10.1.0.0/16", "10.0.0.0/8"},
},
{
name: "duplicates are dropped",
ip: "10.1.2.3",
prefixLens: []int{24, 24, 24},
want: []string{"10.1.2.0/24"},
},
{
name: "lengths of the other family are skipped",
ip: "10.1.2.3",
prefixLens: []int{48, 64, 24},
want: []string{"10.1.2.0/24"},
},
{
name: "out of range lengths are skipped",
ip: "10.1.2.3",
prefixLens: []int{-1, 33, 129, 8},
want: []string{"10.0.0.0/8"},
},
{
name: "ipv6 keeps its own lengths",
ip: "2001:db8::1",
prefixLens: []int{32, 64},
want: []string{"2001:db8::/64", "2001:db8::/32"},
},
{
name: "no length gives no key",
ip: "10.1.2.3",
prefixLens: []int{},
want: []string{},
},
{
name: "invalid ip gives no key",
ip: "invalid",
prefixLens: []int{24},
want: nil,
},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := CIDRLookupKeys(tt.ip, tt.prefixLens)
if len(got) != len(tt.want) {
t.Fatalf("CIDRLookupKeys(%q, %v) = %v, want %v", tt.ip, tt.prefixLens, got, tt.want)
}
for i := range got {
if got[i] != tt.want[i] {
t.Errorf("CIDRLookupKeys(%q, %v)[%d] = %q, want %q", tt.ip, tt.prefixLens, i, got[i], tt.want[i])
}
}
})
}
}
// TestCIDRLookupKeys_SubsetOfCIDRKeys: restricting the lengths only removes candidates,
// it never changes the key of a length that is kept.
func TestCIDRLookupKeys_SubsetOfCIDRKeys(t *testing.T) {
for _, ipStr := range []string{"10.1.2.3", "2001:db8::1", "::ffff:10.1.2.3"} {
t.Run(ipStr, func(t *testing.T) {
all := CIDRKeys(ipStr)
maxBits := len(all) - 1
for bits := 0; bits <= maxBits; bits++ {
got := CIDRLookupKeys(ipStr, []int{bits})
if len(got) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("CIDRLookupKeys(%q, [%d]) returned %d keys", ipStr, bits, len(got))
}
if want := all[maxBits-bits]; got[0] != want {
t.Errorf("CIDRLookupKeys(%q, [%d]) = %q, want %q", ipStr, bits, got[0], want)
}
}
})
}
}
func TestCIDRPrefixLen(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
input string
want int
}{
{"10.0.0.0/8", 8},
{"10.0.0.0/32", 32},
{"0.0.0.0/0", 0},
{"10.0.0.5/24", 24},
{" 10.0.0.0/16 ", 16},
{"2001:db8::/32", 32},
{"2001:db8::/128", 128},
{"::/0", 0},
{"10.0.0.1", -1},
{"invalid", -1},
{"", -1},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.input, func(t *testing.T) {
if got := CIDRPrefixLen(tt.input); got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("CIDRPrefixLen(%q) = %d, want %d", tt.input, got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestNormalizeCIDR(t *testing.T) {
tests := []struct {
input string
want string
}{
{"10.0.0.0/8", "10.0.0.0/8"},
{"10.0.0.0/16", "10.0.0.0/16"},
{"192.168.1.0/24", "192.168.1.0/24"},
{"2001:db8::/32", "2001:db8::/32"},
{"0.0.0.0/0", "0.0.0.0/0"},
{"::/0", "::/0"},
{"invalid", ""},
{"", ""},
{" 10.0.0.0/8 ", "10.0.0.0/8"},
}
for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.input, func(t *testing.T) {
got := NormalizeCIDR(tt.input)
if got != tt.want {
t.Errorf("NormalizeCIDR(%q) = %q, want %q", tt.input, got, tt.want)
}
})
}
}
+17 -9
View File
@@ -78,11 +78,11 @@ ensure_mock() {
# Poll a URL until it returns the expected status code, or fail.
# Usage: wait_for_status URL CODE [TIMEOUT_SECONDS] [curl args...]
wait_for_status() {
local url="$1" expected="$2" timeout="${3:-30}"
local url="$1" expected="$2" timeout="${3:-15}"
shift 3 || true
local elapsed=0 got=""
while (( elapsed < timeout )); do
got=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' "$@" "$url" || true)
got=$(curl -s -m 1 -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' "$@" "$url" || true)
if [[ "$got" == "$expected" ]]; then
return 0
fi
@@ -98,11 +98,11 @@ wait_for_status() {
# code alone can't tell the states apart (e.g. captcha page vs backend, both 200).
# Usage: wait_for_body_contains URL NEEDLE [TIMEOUT_SECONDS] [curl args...]
wait_for_body_contains() {
local url="$1" needle="$2" timeout="${3:-30}"
local url="$1" needle="$2" timeout="${3:-15}"
shift 3 || true
local elapsed=0 body=""
while (( elapsed < timeout )); do
body=$(curl -s "$@" "$url" || true)
body=$(curl -s -m 1 "$@" "$url" || true)
if grep -q "$needle" <<<"$body"; then
return 0
fi
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ assert_status() {
local url="$1" expected="$2"
shift 2 || true
local got
got=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' "$@" "$url")
got=$(curl -s --connect-timeout 1 -m 5 -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' "$@" "$url")
if [[ "$got" != "$expected" ]]; then
echo "assert_status: $url expected $expected, got $got" >&2
return 1
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ assert_header() {
local url="$1" header="$2" expected="$3"
shift 3 || true
local got
got=$(curl -s -D - -o /dev/null "$@" "$url" | tr -d '\r' \
got=$(curl -s --connect-timeout 1 -m 5 -D - -o /dev/null "$@" "$url" | tr -d '\r' \
| awk -v h="${header,,}" -F': ' 'tolower($1) == h { print $2; exit }')
if [[ "$got" != "$expected" ]]; then
echo "assert_header: $url header $header expected \"$expected\", got \"$got\"" >&2
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ assert_body_contains() {
local url="$1" needle="$2"
shift 2 || true
local body
body=$(curl -s "$@" "$url")
body=$(curl -s --connect-timeout 1 -m 5 "$@" "$url")
if ! grep -q "$needle" <<<"$body"; then
echo "assert_body_contains: $url expected to contain \"$needle\", got:" >&2
echo "$body" >&2
@@ -158,12 +158,20 @@ assert_body_contains() {
lapi_add_decision() {
local ip="$1" type="${2:-ban}" duration="${3:-4h}"
curl -sS -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:${LAPI_PORT}/admin/decisions?ip=${ip}&type=${type}&duration=${duration}" >/dev/null
curl -sS --connect-timeout 1 -m 5 -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:${LAPI_PORT}/admin/decisions?ip=${ip}&type=${type}&duration=${duration}" >/dev/null
}
lapi_delete_decision() {
local ip="$1"
curl -sS -X DELETE "http://127.0.0.1:${LAPI_PORT}/admin/decisions?ip=${ip}" >/dev/null
curl -sS --connect-timeout 1 -m 5 -X DELETE "http://127.0.0.1:${LAPI_PORT}/admin/decisions?ip=${ip}" >/dev/null
}
lapi_set_stream_fail() {
curl -sS --connect-timeout 1 -m 5 -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:${LAPI_PORT}/admin/stream-fail" >/dev/null
}
lapi_clear_stream_fail() {
curl -sS --connect-timeout 1 -m 5 -X DELETE "http://127.0.0.1:${LAPI_PORT}/admin/stream-fail" >/dev/null
}
# --- stack lifecycle ---------------------------------------------------------
+19
View File
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import (
"net/http"
"strings"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
)
// Decision is the subset of a LAPI decision the plugin actually reads.
@@ -34,6 +35,9 @@ var (
mu sync.Mutex
active = map[string]Decision{} // ip -> decision currently in force
deleted = map[string]Decision{} // ip -> decision to report in the stream "deleted" list
// streamFail makes /v1/decisions/stream return 500 when set, to exercise the
// bouncer's fail-closed behaviour on consecutive stream poll failures.
streamFail atomic.Bool
)
func writeJSON(w http.ResponseWriter, v any) {
@@ -173,6 +177,10 @@ func main() {
// "deleted". Re-sending the same on every poll is harmless — the plugin just
// re-adds to / re-deletes from its cache.
mux.HandleFunc("/v1/decisions/stream", func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
if streamFail.Load() {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
return
}
mu.Lock()
defer mu.Unlock()
writeJSON(w, map[string][]Decision{"new": list(active), "deleted": list(deleted)})
@@ -183,6 +191,17 @@ func main() {
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusCreated)
})
// Test control plane: make the stream endpoint fail (POST) or recover (DELETE).
mux.HandleFunc("/admin/stream-fail", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
switch r.Method {
case http.MethodPost:
streamFail.Store(true)
case http.MethodDelete:
streamFail.Store(false)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
})
// Test control plane: add / remove decisions instead of cscli.
mux.HandleFunc("/admin/decisions", func(_ http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
q := r.URL.Query()
+11 -3
View File
@@ -11,17 +11,25 @@ body() {
echo "[$SCENARIO] no decision -> request passes (LAPI queried per request)"
assert_status "http://127.0.0.1:${WEB_PORT}/foo" 200 -H "X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4"
echo "[$SCENARIO] adding ban decision for 1.2.3.4"
echo "[$SCENARIO] adding ban decision for 1.2.3.4 and 2001:db8::1"
lapi_add_decision 1.2.3.4 ban 5m
lapi_add_decision "2001:db8::1" ban 5m
echo "[$SCENARIO] none mode has no cache -> next request must be blocked immediately"
echo "[$SCENARIO] IP banned must be blocked (HTTP 403)"
assert_status "http://127.0.0.1:${WEB_PORT}/foo" 403 -H "X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4"
echo "[$SCENARIO] IPv6 banned must be blocked (HTTP 403)"
assert_status "http://127.0.0.1:${WEB_PORT}/foo" 403 -H "X-Forwarded-For: 2001:db8::1"
echo "[$SCENARIO] deleting decision"
lapi_delete_decision 1.2.3.4
lapi_delete_decision "2001:db8::1"
echo "[$SCENARIO] previously banned IP must pass again immediately"
echo "[$SCENARIO] previously banned IP must pass again"
assert_status "http://127.0.0.1:${WEB_PORT}/foo" 200 -H "X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4"
echo "[$SCENARIO] previously banned IPv6 must pass again"
wait_for_status "http://127.0.0.1:${WEB_PORT}/foo" 200 15 -H "X-Forwarded-For: 2001:db8::1"
}
run_scenario "$SCENARIO" "$HERE" body
@@ -18,7 +18,8 @@ http:
bouncer:
enabled: "true"
crowdsecMode: stream
updateIntervalSeconds: "2"
updateIntervalSeconds: "1"
updateMaxFailure: "2"
crowdsecLapiScheme: http
crowdsecLapiHost: "@@LAPI_HOST@@"
crowdsecLapiKey: "@@APIKEY@@"
+22 -2
View File
@@ -11,8 +11,9 @@ body() {
echo "[$SCENARIO] no decision yet -> request allowed"
assert_status "http://127.0.0.1:${WEB_PORT}/foo" 200 -H "X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4"
echo "[$SCENARIO] adding ban decision for 1.2.3.4"
echo "[$SCENARIO] adding ban decision for 1.2.3.4 and 10.0.0.0/8"
lapi_add_decision 1.2.3.4 ban 5m
lapi_add_decision 10.0.0.0/24 ban 5m
echo "[$SCENARIO] banned IP must be blocked once the next stream poll lands (HTTP 403)"
wait_for_status "http://127.0.0.1:${WEB_PORT}/foo" 403 15 -H "X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4"
@@ -20,11 +21,30 @@ body() {
echo "[$SCENARIO] non-banned IP must still pass (HTTP 200)"
assert_status "http://127.0.0.1:${WEB_PORT}/foo" 200 -H "X-Forwarded-For: 5.6.7.8"
echo "[$SCENARIO] deleting ban decision"
echo "[$SCENARIO] banned IP in CIDR must be blocked once polled (HTTP 403)"
wait_for_status "http://127.0.0.1:${WEB_PORT}/foo" 403 15 -H "X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.1"
echo "[$SCENARIO] deleting ban decision for 1.2.3.4 and 10.0.0.0/8"
lapi_delete_decision 1.2.3.4
lapi_delete_decision 10.0.0.0/24
echo "[$SCENARIO] previously banned IP must pass again once the deletion is polled"
wait_for_status "http://127.0.0.1:${WEB_PORT}/foo" 200 15 -H "X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4"
echo "[$SCENARIO] previously CIDR-banned IP must pass again once deletion is polled"
wait_for_status "http://127.0.0.1:${WEB_PORT}/foo" 200 15 -H "X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.1"
echo "[$SCENARIO] making the stream endpoint fail -> bouncer must pass for one more cycle (updateMaxFailure: 2)"
lapi_set_stream_fail
sleep 2 # update cache is every 1 seconds then waiting for minimum 1 cycle
wait_for_status "http://127.0.0.1:${WEB_PORT}/foo" 200 15 -H "X-Forwarded-For: 8.8.8.8"
echo "[$SCENARIO] bouncer must block everything (isStreamHealthy: false)"
wait_for_status "http://127.0.0.1:${WEB_PORT}/foo" 403 15 -H "X-Forwarded-For: 8.8.8.8"
echo "[$SCENARIO] restoring the stream endpoint -> bouncer must recover and pass again"
lapi_clear_stream_fail
wait_for_status "http://127.0.0.1:${WEB_PORT}/foo" 200 15 -H "X-Forwarded-For: 8.8.8.8"
}
run_scenario "$SCENARIO" "$HERE" body